A probabilistic framework is developed in which one can analyze both the classical and the quantum games. We suggest exploiting peculiar probabilities involved in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments to construct quantum games. In our framework a game attains classical interpretation when probabilities are factorizable and a quantum game corresponds when probabilities cannot be factorized. We analyze how non-factorizability changes Nash equilibria in two-player games while considering the games of Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. For Prisoner's Dilemma we find that even non-factorizable EPR probabilities cannot be helpful to escape from the classical outcome of the game. For a particular version of the Chicken game, we find that the two nonfactorizable sets of probabilities, that maximally violates the ClauserHolt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) sum of correlations, indeed result in new Nash equilibria. However, for Stag Hunt the same sets are excluded by requiring that factorizable probabilities lead to the classical game.
Introduction
Usual approach in the area of quantum games [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] consists of analyzing a quantum system manoeuvred by participating agents, recognized as players, who possess necessary means for their actions on parts of the system. The quantum system evolves to its final state and players' payoffs, or utilities, mathematically expressed as expectation values of self-adjoint payoff operators, are generated from quantum measurement [9] . Thus the usual constructions of quantum games involve concepts of quantum state vectors, entangled states, quantum measurement, expectation values, trace operation, and that of density operators etc. This may seem normal because as being part of the research field of quantum computation [10] quantum games are expected to exploit relevant tools from quantum mechanics. However, in our experience this noticeable reliance of the models of quantum games on the tools of quantum mechanics also succeeds to keep many readers away from this inter-disciplinary area of research. Ideally they would like to see genuine quantum games constructed from elementary probabilistic concepts, as it is the case with many examples in game theory [11] . We find this situation as an opportunity to present a probabilistic approach in which quantum games are constructed without referring to the tools of quantum mechanics.
While looking for the possibility of such an approach, it is encouraging to find that the most unusual character of quantum mechanics can be expressed in terms of probabilities [12] only. For example, Bell inequalities [13, 14, 15, 9] can be expressed in terms of constraints on probabilities relevant to pairs of certain random variables. As probabilities are central to usual analyses in game theory, it seems natural to use the peculiar probabilities, responsible for the violation of Bell inequalities, to construct quantum games. We, therefore, suggest to construct quantum games from the probabilities arising in the EinsteinPodolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments [16, 13, 15, 17, 9] performed to test the violation of Bell inequalities. The most unusual character of the EPR probabilities being that they may not be factorizable motivates us, in this paper, to find how non-factorizability can be used to construct quantum games. In other words, we search for the role of non-factorizable probabilities in game-theoretic solution concepts when EPR experiments provide the sets of non-factorizable probabilities.
This explicitly probabilistic approach towards quantum games is expected to be of interest to the readers from such areas as mathematical economics [18] and evolutionary biology [19] , where game theory finds extensive applications and the tools of quantum mechanics are found to be rather alien. Secondly, because of its exclusively probabilistic content, this approach promises to provide a unified perspective for both the classical and the quantum games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the role of factorizability in deriving Bell inequality. Section 3 discusses playing twoplayer games using factorizable probabilities and presents two-and four-coin setups to play the well known games of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), Stag Hunt (SH), and Chicken [11] . Section 4 describes playing two-player games with EPR experiments. Section 5 develops a framework in which factorizable probabilities lead to the classical game whereas non-factorizable probabilities result in the quantum game. Section 6 discusses the results and presents a view for further work.
Factorizability and violation of Bell inequality
Factorizability is known to be an interesting property of coupled systems with separated parts, saying [20] that for such systems the probability for a simultaneous pair of outcomes can be expressed as the product of the probability for each outcome separately. Mathematically, this is expressed by writing joint probabilities as the arithmetic product of their respective marginals [21] . It turns out to be the most important technical ingredient in the proof of Bell inequality. In fact, J. S. Bell used factorizability in his mathematical formulation of locality [9] . Others [20, 22, 21] have recognized it, for example, by such terms as "conditional stochastic dependence."
We describe factorizability with reference to the standard EPR setup [17, 9] used to derive Bell inequality. Lets specify the state of a coupled system by λ that is allowed to evolve itself. We call a to be Alice's parameter that, in our notation, can be set either at S 1 or at S 2 . Similarly, we call b to be Bob's parameter that can be set either at S ′ 1 or at S ′ 2 . They are also denoted simply as a = 1, 2 and b = 1, 2. We denote the probability that Alice gets π A = ± by Pr(λ; π A , a) and, similarly, denote the probability that Bob gets π B = ± by Pr(λ; π B ; b). Also, we denote the probability that both Alice and Bob get π A and π B respectively by Pr(λ; π A π B ; ab).
In repeated runs, Alice can also decide a probability distribution between S 1 or S 2 . In similar situation, Bob can decide a probability distribution between S
Assume that the source emits a total of N two-particle systems. We denote by N (π A ; a) the number of times Alice gets π A when she may set a either at S 1 or at S 2 . Similarly, we denote by N (π B ; b) the number of times Bob gets π B when he may set b either at S ′ 1 or at S ′ 2 . And, we denote by N (π A π B ; ab) the number of times when Alice gets π A and Bob too gets π B , wherever they may set their parameters a and b, respectively. When N is large, the ensemble probabilities are then defined as
For repeated runs we consider an ensemble of states emitted from the source those may not be same. To allow mixture of states we let ρ(λ) to be the normalized probability density characterizing the ensemble of emissions. The ensemble probabilities are
where Γ is the space of the states λ. Now the concept of factorizability is mathematically stated as
That is, at each λ the joint probabilities are the arithmetic product of their respective marginals. After this definition we describe in the following how factorizability is the most important technical ingredient in the proof of Bell inequality. Recalling that Alice's parameter a can be set at S 1 or at S 2 and Bob's parameter b can be set at S ′ 1 or at S ′ 2 , the following inequalities must hold if probabilities are sensible quantities:
We now refer to a theorem stating that when we are given six numbers ω 1 , ω 2 , ̟ 1 , ̟ 2 , ς 1 , and ς 2 such that
The proof of this theorem is elementary and can, for example, be found in Ref. [23] . Inequalities (4) together with the inequalities (6) give
for each λ. The central role of factorizability in Bell inequality is now seen as follows. If the definition of factorizability, as it is stated in (3), holds then multiplication in (7) by ρ(λ) and integration over λ gives
which is the Bell (or Clauser-Horne) inequality [23] . Notice that the definition (3) is crucial in order to obtain the inequality (8).
3 Two-player games using factorizable probabilities
In order to bring non-factorizability to the realm of two-player games, we consider a symmetric two-player two-strategy non-cooperative game [11] that is given as
where all K, L, M, N are real numbers. Players can go for one of the two available strategies: X 1 , X 2 for Alice and X Recognizing that the assumption of factorizability is central to obtaining Bell inequality, we will construct quantum games from non-factorizable probabilities. So as to find the role for such probabilities in two-player games, we suggest exploiting the EPR setup. This rests on Fine's view [20] that the violation of Bell inequality in EPR experiments proves that quantum theory violates factorizability. This view allows us to construct quantum games those violate Bell inequality always, which are realized along with the requirement that factorizability always corresponds to the classical game.
We recognize key features of an EPR setup being that these relate to a probabilistic system divided into two parts such that a) each observer has access to one part of the system b) each observer can select between two available choices c) observers cannot communicate between themselves d) observers can make independent selections between the available choices e) probabilities relevant to each part of the system are normalized 1 and that f) probabilities are sensible quantities.
We find it relevant to mention here that the experimental testing of the Bell inequality involves 4 correlation experiments that correspond to combining S 1 with S ′ 1 , S 1 with S ′ 2 , S 2 with S ′ 1 , and S 2 with S ′ 2 , respectively. These experiments are mutually exclusive in the sense that for any given experiment Alice has to select between S 1 and S 2 and Bob has to select between S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 . That is, Alice cannot go for S 1 and S 2 simultaneously because the corresponding observables are incompatible and cannot be measured simultaneously. Whereas, in the above derivation of the Bell inequality it is assumed that S 1 , S ′ 1 , S 2 , S ′ 2 all have definite values which can be measured simultaneously in pairs.
Games with coins
The above mentioned features remind us of coins which, if distributed between players, are found to have all the above mentioned properties. For coins factor-izability has a straightforward meaning in that the associated probabilities remain factorizable. Hence, we introduce two-player games with non-factorizable probabilities by first translating playing of three well known games in terms of the games played when players share coins. It turns out that a version of such a translation provides the right comparison with the probabilities involved in the EPR experiments and opens the way to the next step i.e. introducing non-factorizable probabilities into the playing of two-player games.
Two-coin setup
We now consider pairs of coins and use it to play a two-player game (9) . For example, this game can be played when each player receives a coin, head up, and 'to flip' or to 'not to flip' is a player's strategy. Both coins are then passed to a referee who rewards the players after observing the state of both coins.
Assume S 1 and S 2 are Alice's strategies and S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 are Bob's strategies. That is, with reference to the matrices (9), we make the association S 1 ∼ X 1 , S 2 ∼ X 2 , and S
We assume that the strategies S 1 and S ′ 1 represent Alice's and Bob's actions to flip the coin, respectively; and, similarly, S 2 and S ′ 2 represent Alice's and Bob's actions not to flip the coin, respectively. In repeated runs of the game players can play mixed strategies. Alice's mixed strategy x ∈ [0, 1] is a probability distribution between S 1 and S 2 and similarly Bob's mixed strategy y ∈ [0, 1] is a probability distribution between S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 . Players' payoffs is written as
In the rest of this paper we will use "NE" when we refer to either a Nash equilibrium or to Nash equilibria, assuming that the right meaning can be judged from the context. We identify this suggestion to play a two-player game using two coins as being the two-coin setup.
Four-coin setup
The game (9) can also be played using four coins instead of two. It is to be arranged such that each player receives two coins and is asked to select one out of the two in each run. The two selected coins, one by each player, are then passed to a referee who tosses them both, observes the outcome, and rewards the players. A player's strategy is defined by the selection she/he makes over several runs of the game. For example, a player plays a pure strategy when she/he goes for the same coin over all the runs of the game and plays a mixed strategy when she/he finds a probability distribution between selecting one or the other coin over repeated runs. Referee rewards the players according to their strategies, the underlying statistics of four coins obtained from the outcomes of several tosses, and the matrices (9) representing the game being played. We identify the arrangement in which a two-player game is played using four coins as being the four-coin setup. Note that as players' rewards depend on the outcomes of repeated tosses even for pure strategies, a large number of runs are a must for the game both for the pure-strategy and the mixed-strategy versions of the game. That is, this setup provides inherently probabilistic character to playing a two-player game and turns out to be the appropriate system for analysis when we seek to play the game (9) using EPR experiments.
Assume S 1 and S 2 are Alice's coins and S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 are Bob's coins. When selecting a coin is a player's strategy and we want to play the game given by the matrices (9), it is reasonable to make the association S 1 ∼ X 1 , S 2 ∼ X 2 , and S
We represent the head of a coin by H and its tail by T. We associate H with + and T with − and adapt this convention in the rest of this paper. For coins, Alice's outcome of π A = +1 or −1 (whether she goes for S 1 or S 2 ) is independent from Bob's outcome of π B = +1 or −1 (whether he goes for S ′ 1 or S ′ 2 ) and the associated probabilities are factorizable. Referring to the definition (3) of factorizability and noticing that probabilities associated to coins are factorizable, we use the same notation that is introduced in Section 2 to consider, for example, the probability Pr(π A π B ; ab) that can be factorized as being Pr(π A ; S 1 ) Pr(π B ; S 2 ) for Bob. In four-coin setup we find it useful to have the following table:
from which we define payoff relations for the players:
For example, Π A (S 1 , S ′ 2 ) is Alice's payoff when, in repeated runs of coin tossing, she always goes for the coin S 1 while Bob goes for the coin S ′ 2 .
As it is the case with two-coin setup, Alice's mixed strategy in four-coin setup consists of a probability distribution over her pure strategies 2 S 1 and S 2 during repeated runs of the experiment. Similarly, Bob's mixed strategy consists of a probability distribution over his pure strategies S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 during repeated runs of the experiment. Assume that Alice plays S 1 with probability x and Bob plays S ′ 1 with probability y, their mixed-strategy payoff relations are
where T is for transpose. The NE can then be found from (11), which is written as
In the following, before we make a transition to playing our game using an EPR experiments, we consider playing three well known games using both the twoand the four-coin setups.
Examples
We analyze the games of PD, SH, and Chicken in two-and four-coin setups and afterwards make a transition to the EPR setup. PD is known to best represent the problem of social cooperation [11] and has been one of the earliest [2] and favorite topics for quantum games.
Hence it is worthwhile to analyze this game in the setup using non-factorizable probabilities. Our second game is SH that, like PD, describes conflict between safety and social cooperation. SH is known to represent another context to study the problem of social cooperation and is considered to be equally interesting game as PD. Our third game is Chicken that is also known as the Hawk-Dove game [11] . It is an influential model of conflict for two players in game theory. Different names for this game originate from the parallel development of the basic principles in two different research areas: economics and mathematical biology. Political scientists and economists [18] refer to this game as "Chicken" while mathematical biologists [19] refer to it as the "Hawk-Dove" game.
Prisoner's Dilemma
For PD we identify X 1 , X ′ 1 ∼ Deny and identify X 2 , X ′ 2 ∼ Confess in the matrices (9) and it is required that
We define
so that for PD we have
and (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (0, 0) comes out as a unique NE at which players' payoffs are
In the four-coin setup, the PD can be played as follows. Using the mixedstrategy payoff relation (15), the pair of pure strategies (S 2 , S ′ 2 ) is represented by (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (0, 0). Assume that we require this strategy pair to be a NE then we also need to know about the constraints this requirement imposes on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . When (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (0, 0), the NE inequalities (16) , for the PD defined by (17, 18) , are reduced to
Now, for the NE inequalities (22) to hold, it is required that (s − r) ≤ 0 and (s ′ − r ′ ) ≤ 0 both when △ 1 /△ 2 ≥ 1 and △ 1 /△ 2 < 1. This is, of course, possible if
which must hold if the strategy pair (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (0, 0) is to be a NE in PD. Eqs. (23) should be true along with that the probabilities Pr(π A π B ; ab) are factorizable. As we find it, this result provides the basis on which the forthcoming argument for the quantum version of this game rests. Notice that, from (13), we obtain Π A (S 2 , S 
However, it is found that this freedom does not affect the forthcoming argument for a quantum game.
Stag Hunt
Referring to the matrices (9) the game of SH is defined by
In two-coin setup the NE inequalities for this game remain the same as the inequalities (20) except that now we have
where we define
Now consider playing this game within the four-coin setup in which the NE inequalities (16) reduce to
From the inequalities (30) the NE (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) 1 = (0, 0) results when
and, similarly, the NE (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) 3 = (1, 1) results when
Also, the inequalities (30) hold when
to be a NE we require s = 0, r = 1 and s ′ = 0, r ′ = 1.
These constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ hold along with the probabilities Pr(π A π B ; ab) being factorizable.
Chicken game
A version of the Chicken game is obtained from the matrices (9) when
The principle of this game being that while each player prefers not to yield to the opponent, the outcome where neither player yields is the worst possible one for both players. It is an anti-coordination game in which it is mutually beneficial for the players to play different strategies. While being mathematically identical to the Hawk-Dove game, the Chicken game is also similar to PD in thatr = 0 and s ′ = 0.
Similarly, for (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) 3 = (0, 1) we require r ′ = 0 and s = 0.
At (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) 2 = (α/(α + β), α/(α + β)) the inequalities (30) reduce to
which puts constraint on r, s, r ′ , s ′ given as
A special case is the one when α = β and the strategy pair (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (1/2, 1/2) becomes a NE which imposes certain constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . For this NE the inequalities (16) , for the game defined by (9, 34) , are reduced to
so, we require
if the strategy pair (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (1/2, 1/2) is to be a NE in this game. Along with this, the probabilities Pr(π A π B ; ab) are to be factorizable.
Playing games with EPR experiments
Section 3 describes playing a two-player game with four coins such that selecting a coin is a strategy while players' payoffs are given by their strategies, the matrix of the game, and the underlying statistics of the coins. This facilitates transition to playing the same game using EPR experiments.
In EPR setup, Alice and Bob are spatially separated and are unable to communicate with each other. In an individual run, both receive one half of a pair of particles originating from a common source. In the same run of the experiment both choose one from two given (pure) strategies. These strategies are the two directions in space along which spin or polarization measurements can be made.
Keeping the notation for the coins, we denote these directions to be S 1 , S 2 for Alice and S ′ 1 , S ′ 2 for Bob. Each measurement generates +1 or −1 as the outcome, like it is the case with coins after their toss in the four-coin setup. Experimental results are recorded for a large number of individual runs of the experiment and payoffs are awarded depending on which directions the players go over many runs (defining their strategies), the matrix of the game they play, and the statistics of the measurement outcomes.
For EPR experiments, we retain Cereceda' notation [24] for the associated probabilities:
(44) In this notation, for example, we write p 1 for the probability Pr(++; S 1 , S ′ 1 ) and p 8 for the probability Pr(−−; S 1 , S ′ 2 ). One can then construct the following table of probabilities Alice B ; a, b) , where we recall that a can be set at S 1 or at S 2 and, similarly, b can be set at S 2 or at S ′ 2 . In Cereceda's notation the EPR probabilities p i are normalized as they satisfy the following relations
Notice that the factorizable probabilities (12) are also normalized and (46) holds for them. Payoff relations (13) are originally constructed when the game given by the matrices (9) is played with four coins and their mathematical form convinces one to use the following recipe to reward the players when the same game is played using EPR probabilities (45):
Here Π A (S 1 , S ′ 2 ), for example, is Alice's payoff when she plays S 1 and Bob plays S When p i are factorizable in terms of r, r ′ , s, s ′ , a comparison of (47) with (13) requires
(48) That is, the factorizability of p i in terms r, r ′ , s, s ′ makes the game played by EPR probabilities equivalent to the one played by using coins.
However, the EPR probabilities p i , appearing in (13), may not be factorizable in terms of r, s, r ′ , s ′ , whereas for both the payoff relations (13, 47) the normalization (46) continues to hold.
Two-player games using non-factorizable probabilities
As it is the case with the coin game, Alice's mixed strategy is defined to be a probability distribution over S 1 and S 2 and we can use, once again, the payoff relations (15) which, however, now corresponds to the possible situation when p i are not factorizable. So that, the relations (13) 
which are useful relations for the forthcoming argument for a quantum game. Along with the normalization (46), the EPR probabilities p i (1 ≤ i ≤ 16) also satisfy certain other constraints imposed by the requirements of causality. Cereceda [24] writes these constraints as
which is referred to as the causal communication constraint [24] . Notice that the constraints (50), of course, also hold when p i are factorizable and are written in terms of r, s, r ′ , s ′ as in (48). Essentially, these constraints say that, on measurement, Alice's probability of obtaining particular outcome (+1 or −1), when she goes for S 1 or S 2 , is independent of how Bob sets up his apparatus (i.e. along S ′ 1 or along S ′ 2 ) without Bob actually performing the measurement. The same applies to Bob i.e. on measurement his probability of obtaining a particular outcome (+1 or −1), when he goes for S ′ 1 or S ′ 2 , is independent of how Alice sets up her apparatus (i.e. along S 1 or along S 2 ) without Alice actually performing the measurement. Other authors may like to call the constraint (50) with some different name, for example, Winsberg and Fine [21] have described them as the locality constraint.
Notice that because of normalization (46) half of the Eqs. (50) are redundant that makes eight among sixteen probabilities p i to be independent. A convenient solution [24] of the system (46, 50), for which the set of variables:
is expressed in terms of the remaining set of variables:
is given as follows
The relationships (53) between joint probabilities arise because both the normalization condition (46) and the causal communication constraint (50) are fulfilled. From Eqs. (53) one can obtain other constraints considering that the sum of any combination of probabilities from the set υ must be non-negative. In the following are some results to be used later in this paper. In (53) the sum p 2 + p 7 is non-negative and it requires that
In (53) the sum p 3 + p 10 is non-negative and it requires that
Similarly, the sum p 6 + p 13 is non-negative and it requires that
Notice that the probabilities associated to the EPR experiments can be factorized only for certain directions of measurements even for singlet states. For these directions the game played using EPR experiments can thus be interpreted in terms of the four-coin setup. Essentially, we obtain quantum game from the classical as follows. Referring to the four-coin setup developed in the Section 3, the factorizability of associated probabilities in terms of r, s, r ′ , s ′ allows us to translate the requirement that the resulting game has a classical interpretation into certain constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . We find that from factorizability the relations (49) follow and from these relations the constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ can be re-expressed in terms of p i (1 ≤ i ≤ 16). We now obtain a quantum version of the game by retaining these constraints and afterwards allowing p i to become non-factorizable. In this procedure retaining the constraints ensures that classical outcome results when probabilities become factorizable.
Examples
In the following we consider the impact of non-factorizable probabilities on the NE in PD, SH, and the Chicken game.
Prisoner's Dilemma
Recall that Section 3 states the result that when PD is played with four coins we require the condition (23) to hold if the strategy pair (S 2 , S ′ 2 ) is to exist as a NE. Along with this the probabilities p i are to be factorizable.
This motivates to construct a quantum version of PD when probabilities p i are not factorizable while the constraint (23) remains valid. The condition (23) ensures that with factorizable probabilities the game can be interpreted classically.
Notice that when the probabilities p i are factorizable, i.e. they can be written as in (48), the constraint (23) can hold when numerical values are assigned to certain probabilities among p i :
where, because of the normalization (46), p 16 = 0 requires that p 13 = 0, p 14 = 0, and p 15 = 0. This can also be noticed more directly from (49). This assignment of values to certain probabilities reduces Eqs. (46) and Eqs. (50) to
So that, the list of possible NE those can arise in quantum SH consists of five members i.e. (0, 0), (1, 1) ,
Which one, or more, from this list are going to arise depends on the set of non-factorizable probabilities. For example, we notice that there exist [24] two sets of nonfactorizable probabilities that maximally violate the quantum prediction of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) sum of correlations. The first set is
and the second set is
where µ and υ are defined in (51) and in (52), respectively. The probabilities in these sets are non-factorizable because for both sets a solution of the Eqs.
(48) will involve one or more of the probabilities r, s, r ′ , s ′ being negative or greater than one. Now for SH the requirement that factorizable probabilities are to lead to classical game gives rise to three sets of constraints on EPR probabilities given by (62), (74), and (77). These sets of constraints correspond to the NE (x ⋆ , y
, and (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) 3 = (1, 1) respectively. Unfortunately, the probabilities from either of the two sets (86, 87) -which maximally violate the quantum prediction of the CHSH sum of correlations -do not satisfy these constraints. Stated otherwise, the probabilities from the sets (86, 87) are in conflict with the requirement that factorizable probabilities must lead to the classical game of SH. However, other sets of nonfactorizable probabilities can be found those are consistent with this requirement and depending on the elements of a set, one or more out of five possible NE may emerge. This situation can be described by saying that in SH non-factorizability can lead to new NE but, unfortunately, either of the sets (86, 87) cannot be used for this purpose.
Chicken game
Refer to Section 3.2.3 and use Eqs. (41) express the constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ in this setup. These constraints are imposed for the strategy pair x ⋆ = α/(α+β) = y ⋆ is to be a NE. Using Eqs. (49) and the normalization (46) translate these constraints in terms of the EPR probabilities p i :
Addition and subtraction of (89) to and from (88) gives
and Eqs. (53) then allow us to re-express Eqs. (90, 91) in terms of the probabilities in set µ, defined in (52), to obtain
Two probabilities can be eliminated from the inequalities (60, 61) using Eqs.
(92, 93). We select (arbitrarily) these to be p 12 and p 15 and express them in terms of other probabilities in the set µ i.e.
Notice that for the Chicken game, defined in (34), one obtains from (18)
which are same as those given in (101, 102), apart from extra negative signs. This results in three strategy pairs (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) = (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1) to come out as the equilibria. Once again, using (15) one finds that at all of these three equilibria both players get equally rewarded by the amount α(2+ √ 2)/4. Hence, while referring to (36), we find that in this special case when α = β the set (87) of probabilities leads to new equilibria of the game. Notice that, like it is the case with the set (86) of probabilities, the constraints (103) continue to hold also for the set (87) when p i are allowed to be non-factorizable.
Discussion
In typical quantization procedure [2, 4] of a two-player game, two qubits are in an entangled state that are given to the players Alice and Bob. Players' strategies consist of performing unitary actions on their respective qubits. Classical game remains a subset of the quantum game in that both players can play quantum strategies those correspond to the strategies available classically. This quantization procedure allows more choices to the players which now also include superpositions of their classical moves. Players having more choices than those allowed in the classical game gives ground to the argument 4 that Enk and Pike [25] have put forward. The setup proposed in this paper uses EPR experiments to play a two-player game and a quantum game is associated to a classical game such that it does not become susceptible to Enk and Pike criticism. It is because both the payoff relations and the players' sets of strategies remain identical [26] in the classical and the associated quantum game. Now it is non-factorizability -responsible for the violation of Bell inequality in EPR experiments -that gives rise to the new solutions in quantum game. When players play a game using a physical system for which joint probabilities are factorizable the classical game results always. In other words, the role of nonfactorizable probabilities is sought in the game-theoretic solution concept of a NE, when the physical realization for these probabilities is provided by the EPR experiments. This analysis introduces a new viewpoint into quantum games in which non-factorizability gets translated into the language of game theory.
The argument put forward in this paper can be described as follows. Firstly, players' payoffs are re-expressed in the form Π A,B (p i , x, y, A, B) where p i are the sixteen joint probabilities; x, y are players strategies, and A, B are players' payoff matrices defined in (9) . Secondly, Nash inequalities are used to impose constraints on p i that ensure that with factorizable p i the game has classical outcome and the resulting payoffs can be interpreted in terms of classical mixedstrategy game. It is achieved by playing the game in the four-coin setup and using Nash inequalities to obtain constraints on the coin probabilities r, s, r ′ , s ′ which reproduce the outcome of the classical mixed-strategy game. Using (49), which results from factorizability, these constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ are then translated in terms of constraints on p i . Thirdly, while referring to the EPR setup, p i are allowed to be non-factorizable when the constraints on p i continue to hold. Fourthly, and lastly, it is observed how non-factorizability leads to the emergence of new solutions of the game.
Note that for a game different sets of constraints are defined depending on which NE is to be the solution of the game. For example, for three NE in Chicken we require three different sets of constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . Considering one of these three sets at a time we repeat the four steps stated above. The same procedure is then repeated for other sets of constraints corresponding to other NE.
That is, in this setup not all solutions of a game are re-expressed in terms of a single set of constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ . Instead, a separate set of constraints is found for each NE. It seems that the four-coin setup is the minimal arrangement that allows one to introduce, in a smooth way, the EPR probabilities into a game-like setting. We suggest that with increasing the number of coins, shared by each of the two players, all the NE of a game can be translated to a single constraint on the underlying coin probabilities which are subsequently translated in terms of p i . This will then allow to see the role of non-factorizability on solution of a game from a single set of constraint. However, this will be obtained at a price: Firstly, more coins with resulting mathematical complexity; secondly, for more coins player's strategy will need to be redefined such that it permits to incorporate EPR probabilities.
Note that the usual approach uses entangled states to construct quantum games and this paper uses non-factorizability to the same end. Mathematically, non-factorizability comes out to be a stronger condition than the condition that translates entanglement into constraints on joint probabilities. That is, a non-factorizable set of probabilities always corresponds to some entangled state but an entangled state can produce a factorizable set of probabilities. For example, in case of singlet state the outcomes of two measurements violate Bell inequality only along certain directions, and not along other directions. In other words, in a quantum game exploiting entangled states, the joint probabilities may still be factorizable but for a quantum game, resulting from non-factorizable probabilities, Bell inequality is bound to be violated. Non-factorizability being a stronger condition may well be suggested as the reason why it cannot be helpful to escape from the classical outcome in PD.
The proposed setup demonstrates how non-factorizability can change outcome of a game. We suggest to extend [27] this setup to analyze multi-player quantum games [28] where players share physical systems for which joint probabilities cannot be factorized.
